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RECENT CASES
terrent effect when law enforcement officials have acted reasonably
and with good faith, although mistakenly. 73 If the officials do their
duty, they will continue to act reasonably and in good faith, even
if they are again proven to be mistaken. 74 All that the exclusionary
rule can do under such circumstances is to impair or abort the
truth-finding process. 75
Justice White therefore seems to believe that the Court should
modify a judge-made rule before changing established statutory in-
terpretations.
By its decision in Stone v. Powell, the Court has relegated
fourth amendment claims to second class status. The Court has de-
nied collateral relief for search and seizure claims, without denying
it for other constitutional claims, although this too may eventually
happen if Justice Brennan's prognostication is correct. The only av-
enue now available for relief when fourth amendment rights have
been violated in state courts is certiorari, the grant of which is an
uncertain prospect.
The heart of the problem seems to lie with the exclusionary
rule, and not with the habeas corpus! provisions. The exclusionary
rule could be modified, in the manner suggested by Justice White,
to avoid unjust results. 76 Defendants who are obviously guilty should
not be allowed to go free, to the detriment of innocent victims and
society, due to some judicially created technicality or to mistakes
made in good faith by conscientious law enforcement officials. How-
ever, the writ of habeas corpus should not be denied to those crimi-
nal defendants who do have legitimate grievances under the fourth
amendment, particularly when the "full and fair opportunity" afford-
ed them in the state courts to litigate their fourth amendment claims
may be less than meaningful.
LAWRENCE R. KLEMIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE THAT
AUTHORIZES ASSESSMENT OF TOWING AND STORAGE FEES AGAINST
IMPOUNDED VEHICLE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR
HEARING DENIES VEHICLE OWNER DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
73. Id. at 3072-73.
74. Id. at 3073.
75. 1(l.
76. Id. at 3072. For proposed modifications of the exclusionary rule, see Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1041-55 (1974). For arguments
against modifying the reach of the exclusionary rule, see Note, The Impending Limitation
of the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule-Will the Supreme Court Vandalize the Constitu-
tion? 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 91 (1973) ; Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An
Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129
(1973).
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Plaintiff discovered his automobile missing from the place where
he had parked it. After he contacted the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment Auto Pound, he learned that his automobile had been ticketed,
towed, and impounded.1 Plaintiff went to the auto pound, demanded
return of his automobile, and was denied return of the automobile
unless he first paid the towing fee and accrued storage charges. Ap-
proximately a week later," plaintiff filed an individual and class ac-
tion in federal district court3 against the defendants, 4 seeking in-
junctive and declaratory relief and damagesA Plaintiff's automobile
was returned to him the same day the action was commenced, with-
out payment of the charges demanded by the auto pound, pursuant
to an agreement with counsel for defendants. Plaintiff claimed
that the initial towing and impoundment of vehicles without prior
notice or opportunity for a hearing, and the assessment of towing
fees and storage charges without prior notice or opportunity for a
hearing, as provided by the ordinance, violated the due process guar-
antees of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.r The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that the initial towing and impoundment of vehicles
did not require prior notice or opportunity for a hearing, but that
assessment of towing fees and storage charges without prior notice
1. Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976). Plaintiff's automobile was
towed and impounded pursuant to NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 38-274 (19- ), which reads
in pertinent part:
Any unoccupied vehicle of any kind or description whatever found vio-
lating any traffic law shall be removed immediately and- impounded by any
police officer or duly authorized person and shall only be surrendered to a
duly identified owner thereof upon the payment of fifteen dollars ($15.00)
hereby declared to be the towing fee covering such impounding. Such owner
shall thereafter have the responsibility of separately disposing of the violation
charge against him at the Violations Bureau or the court having jurisdiction
over such violations.
In addition to the fee for towing said vehicle, there shall be an addi-
tional fee of three dollars ($3.00) for storage of vehicle for each twenty-
four (24) hours or part thereof over and above twenty-four (24) hours
from the time vehicle is towed to the Department Pound. Total storage fee
not to exceed seventy-five dollars ($75.00).
2. Plaintiff discovered his car missing on December 30, 1975 and filed suit on January
5, 1976. 418 F. Supp. 542, 543 (.D. La. 1976).
3. Plaintiff based his action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. The defendants named in the complaint were the mayor and councilmen of the City
of New Orleans; and the superintendent of police and the commanding officer of the auto
pound, New Orleans Police Department; all named individually and in their official ca-
pacities. Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976) (BNA, U.S.L.W. slip
opinion).
5. Counsel for all parties agreed to submit the issue of the validity of the city ordinance
to the court on memoranda, reserving the damage question for a later trial. Id. at 543.
6. Id. at 544.
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or opportunity for a hearing was unconstitutional.7 Remm v. Land-
rieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976).
Although the court in Remm cited no precedent squarely on point
for its decision,8 various theories have been used to attack the val-
idity of similar ordinances in other courts. In Steiner v. City of New
Orleans,' the Louisiana Supreme Court held the assessment of tow-
ing fees and storage charges before return of an impounded vehicle
to be constitutional under the Louisiana Constitution.'" The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's holding that the ordinance
was unconstitutional, and also reversed the trial court's award of
$3.00 damages to plaintiff and stated:
The plaintiff has offered no testimony whatever as to the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the ordinance or of the
fee fixed by the ordinance for impounding vehicles parked
in violation thereof, and, as the passage of the ordinance
was a matter within the legislative power of the commission
council, we think the ordinance is reasonable and constitu-
tional.1
In a replevin action to recover an impounded automobile, an
Ohio court of appeals held in Jackson v. Copelan1 2 that the ordin-
ance "expresses a reasonable exercise of police power vested in the
city by the charter and laws of the state of Ohio, and that, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the fee is reasonable.'
13
Various suits have also been brought to recover the amount paid
for return of vehicles impounded for parking violations. The alleged
grounds for recovery have varied greatly in these actions. One case14
relied on grounds similar to those raised in Steiner v. City of New
Orleans," while another claimed that a city ordinance did not com-
ply with a similar state statute. ' A third case alleged denial of due
7. Id. at 548.
8. Id. at 546.
9. 173 La. 275, 136 So. 596 (1931).
10. Id. at - , 136 So. at 597. LA. CON ST. art. 1, § 2 states:
No person shall 1ie deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due
process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private
property shall not be taken or darnaged except for public purpose. and after
just and adequate compensation is paid.
11. 173 La. 275, - , 136 So. 596,'597 (1931).
12. 50 Ohio App. 414, 198 N.E. 596 (1935). Plaintiff's automobile was released Im-
mediately upon payment of a replevin bond. [d. at - , 198 N.E. at 597. ,Sce also '7-ughes
v. City of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170 P.2d 297 (1946); Park v'. Adams, 289 S.'W.2d 829
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
13. 50 Ohio App. 414, - , 198 N.E. 596, 599 (1935). The court held the ordinance was
not in conflict with the due process clause of the Constitilion. Id. at - , 198 N.E. at 599.
14. M.L. Weiss, Inc. v. Whalen, 125 Misc. 290, 238 N.Y.S. 95 (1929). The court held the
amount required was not in the nature of a fine or penalty, but was intended to rimi-
hurse the street cleaning department, and that an innoco-nt owner could still avail himself
to a judicia I hearing and oltlain ;Ipprolriate redrss. Id. at - , 238 N.Y.S. at 98-99.
15. 173 La. 275, 136 So. 596 (1931).
16. Hatiblhy v. Town of St. Jlhnshury, 130 Vt. 204, - , 290 A.2d 18, 19 (1972).
Plaintiff also sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, but (lid not attack its con-
stitutional validity. Id. at -- , 290 A.2d at 19.
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A fourth claimed a city 'ordinance authorizing impoundment was un-
constitutional because it provided for impoundment whether the ve-
hicle was occupied or not."5
Injunctions have also been sought restraining a city from enforc-
ing the ordinance against an individual plaintiff. 19 Often the claim
in these suits was that the cities were selective in their enforce-
ment and had thus denied the plaintiff equal protection of the laws. 20
In Boss v. City of Splokane,"-2 plaintiff sued the city and two of
its police officers on a theory of conversion.22 Plaintiff alleged that
the impounding of his vehicle was not -authorized by the city ordin-
ance, which provided for removal when a vehicle "constitutes an
obstruction to traffic, blocks the use of a fire hydrant, or provides
a danger to travel." -  Plaintiff claimed that mere overtime parking
was not an "obstruction" as required by the ordinance. 24 The Su-
preme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's judgment
against the police officers as individuals, but reversed the judgment
against the city because the claim against the city was not filed
within the statutorily required thirty day time limit. 25
It is interesting to note that all of the cases previously discussed
have involved state courts. In all of these cases the courts have de-
clared the assessment of towing fees, without prior notice or an op-
portunity for a hearing, to be constitutional. Automobile impound-
ment ordinances have also been considered in four recent United
States District Court cases.
In Seals v. Nichol,2 G plaintiff claimed that the failure to provide
any procedural opportunity to challenge the validity of the seizure
of the automobile violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth
17. Cohen v. City of New York, 69 Misc. 2d lS9, - , 329 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (1972).
Plaintiff claimed that because there were signs posted in other areas, but not where he
parked, Ile was denied due process. Id. at 8-, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 598. The court held that
it was not their function to determine due process. Id. at -, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600.
18. Edwards v. City of Hartford, 145 Conn. 141, - , 139 A.2d 599, 600 (1958). The
court determined that the plaintiff was not present when the impounding procedure began.
Id. at - 139 A.2d at 600-01. The court did not, however, address the question of con-
stitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at - , 139 A.2d at 601.
19. E.g., McLaurine v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 414, 24 So. 2d 755 (1946) : Park v.
Adams, 289 SV.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ; Miller v. Allen, 257 S.V.2d 127 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953) ; Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 290 A.2d 18 (1972).
20. E.g., McLaurine v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 414, - , 24 So. 2d 755, 758
(1946) ; Miller v. Allen, 257 S.V.2d 127, 128 (Tex. ('iv. App. 1953) ; In McLoaliae, "lnin-
tiff also claimed the ordinance denied due process on its face. 247 Ala. 414, -, 24 So. 2d
755, 756 (1946). In both cases, plaintiffs' had long histories of parking violations. Neither
case, however, addressed the assessing of a fee before return of an impounded car.
21. 63 Wash. 2d 305, .87 P.2d 67 (1963).
22. Id. at - , 387 P.2d at 68.
23. SPOKANE, WASH., CITY ORDINANCE No. C 12833 § 46.48.300 (-).
24. 63 'Wash. 2d 305, - , 387 P.2d 67, 68 (1963).
25. Id. at - , 387 P.2d at 69-70.
26. 378 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Il. 1973). Plaintiff's automobile was seized as "prisoner's
property." Although the seizure did not comply Nvith police regulations, the automobile
was destroye, and plaintiff brought the action unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), claiming
he wwas not prperly notified of the seizure and that he was not given an opportunity to
challenge it. 378 F. Supp. 172, 173-75 (N.D. 111. 1973).
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amendments to the Constitution. 27 The court held the failure to be a
violation of due process, because the plaintiff "would not, under pre-
sent procedures, have been able to assert that the arresting officers
had ordered his car towed improperly, and that therefore he should
not be penalized by having to pay the towing and storage fees. ' 28
The court held in Graff v. Nichol, 29 that a state statute 0 and
a city ordinance 3 1 that authorized law enforcement agencies to dis-
pose of "abandoned" motor vehicles which displayed current license
plates and/or city registration decals, was unconstitutional because
it did not provide for prior notice or an opportunity to be heard be-
fore the seizure. 3 2 The court also held that the requirements in the
statute and ordinance that towing and storage charges be paid as a
precondition to the release of an abandoned vehicle, regardless of
whether the owner had been charged with or acquitted of the mis-
demeanor of abandonment,"7 was unconstitutional. 34
In Stephens v. Tielsch 5 plaintiff challenged a Seattle ordinance
that authorized the towing of illegally parked vehicles by private
towing companies. 3G The court held that the assessment of towing
and storage fees, and the detention of impounded vehicles for pur-
poses of securing the payment of such fees without notice and an
opportunity for a prior hearing, by either the city or a private tow-
ing company, was barred by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 37
Another federal case that involved vehicles which had been towed
and impounded by private towing companies is Stypmann v. Nelder.8
In Stypmann, the court held that the imposition of a garagekeeper's
lien to insure payment of towing and storage fees, without prior no-
tice or an opportunity for a hearing, was unconstititional. 9
27. Id. at 177.
28. Id. The ordinance provided for $20.00 for towing and $2.00 per day for storage, and
that the owner would lose all property rights in his vehicle if he did not claim it within
fifteen days. Id.
29. 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. 111. 1974).
30. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%A, Ii 4-201 to 214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
31. CH;CAO, ILL., MON. CODE §§ 27-200, 372, 372.1, 425 (-).
3 2. 370 F. Supp. 974. 987 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%, § 4-201 (Smith-RTurd Supp. 1976).
34. 370 F. Supp. 974, 985 (N.D. II1. 1974). When abandoned motor vehicles obstruct the
traffic flow, thev' are classified as a "hazard," and are subject to immediate tow. Id. at
982. The court stated: "In situations where a vehicle in the requisite state of disrepair is
towed immediately, the hearing should be held before the owner is required to pay any
charges." Id. at 985.
35. Civil No, 73-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (unpublished opinion) cited in Remm v.
Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 547 (E.D. La. 1976).
36. d. at- , cited ia Remm v. Londrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 547 (E.D. La. 1976).
37. Id. at-, cited in Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 547 (E.l). La. 1976).
38. Civil No. C-70-2312 A.JZ (N.). Cal. 1974) (unpublished opinion) cited in Remm V.
LandTrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 547 (JE.). La. 1976). This case is now sub judice in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 418 F. Supp. at 547 n.10.
,9. Civil No. C-70-2312 A.IZ at - (N.I). Cal. 1974) (unpublished opinion) cited in
Remrm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 548 (ED. La. 1976). The court held that San Fran-
cisco's practice of providing for a hearing, within 5 (lays of the citation which resulted in
the tow, with the city absorbing the cost of tows found improper, fell short of the prior
notice or opportunity for a hearing that the Constitution requires. Id.
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The disparity between the holdings of state courts and federal
district courts on the issue of due process requirements for assess-
ment of towing fees can probably be 'best explained by examining
the dates of the decisions. All of the state court decisions were de-
cided prior to early 1972 while the federal cases were decided in
1973 and 1974. On June 12, 1972, the United States Supreme Court
decided Fuentes v. Shevin.41 This case has had a tremendous im-
pact on due process requirements with respect to deprivation of prop-
erty. Fuentes held that there may be extraordinary situations
which allow summary seizure of property without prior notice or op-
portunity for a hearing as required by the Constitution. 41 However,
the Court in Fuentes did set forth three requirements which must
be met before a person's property could be seized without providing
that person notice and an opportunity for a hearing in advance of
the seizure:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly neces-
sary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest. Second, there has been a special need for very
prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for deter-
mining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.42
The court in Remm v. Landrieu41 relied heavily on the guide-
lines set by Fuentes in reaching its decision. First, the court exam-
ined the validity of towing and impounding of illegally parked vehicles
40. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes plaintiffs challenged the constitutional validity of
the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes. The replevin statutes authorized a creditor
to obtain it writ of relplevin by filing a complaint alleging that he was entitled to the
property and by posting a bond in an amount equal to at least double the value of the
property to be replevied. The writ of replevin ordered the state official to whom it was
directed to seize the property and to summon the defendants. The official was required
to hold the seized property for a three-day period and during this period the debtor could
reclaim it by posting his own bond. If the debtor did not do so, the property was trans-
ferred to the creditor, pending a hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim. The court
held the statutes unconstitutional because they allowed state officials, on application of a
private party, to seize the property of a debtor without affording the debtor prior notice
or a prior opportunity to be heard. Id. at 96.
41. The Court listed three cases which allowed attachment without prior hearing: (1)
Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), allowed attachment to protect the
public from a bank failure: (2) Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), permitted at-
tachment of certain shares of stock of a debtor to obtain jurisdiction over him; and (3)
McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), was affirmed on, the authority of Coffin Bros.
and Oweaby. 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). In Fuevtes the Supreme Court stated that It has also
allowed summary seizures of property in certain other situations: Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589 (1931), allowed, seizure to collect the internal revenue; Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921), allowed a seizure during time of war; Fahey v. Mal-
lonee. 332 U.S. 245 (1947), allowed seizure to prevent a bank failure; Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc., ;39 1'.S. 594 W11951), allowed a seizure of misbranded drugs; and
North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), allowed a seizure of con-
taminated food. 407 U.S. 67. 91 (1972).
42. 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
43. 41S F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976).
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without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing. 44 Although this
would be only a temporary deprivation, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.4 5 held that any taking of property for even a short period of
time without due process is repugnant to the Constitution. 46  In
Remm, the court held that the impounding of illegally parked ve-
hicles satisfied the first Fuentes requirement because such impound-
ing was necessary to protect the recognized interest of local govern-
ments in regulating the use of their streets and other public places.4 7
The second Fuentes' requirement of a need for prompt action was
satisfied because public safety and convenience normally require the
prompt removal of illegally parked vehicles . 4  Finally, that a police
officer must make some determination that a city traffic ordinance
is being violated before a vehicle may be towed was held to satisfy
the third requirement of Fuentes, which is strict control by a govern-
ment official.4 9
The Court'in Remm applied the same Fuentes requirements to
assessment of towing and storage fees before return of an impounded
vehicle without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard.5 0 The
court concluded that an extraordinary situation which demanded
prompt action no longer existed after the car had been removed
from the street.5 1 Therefore, the rights of notice and an opportunity
to be heard in advance of the deprivation, or in advance of the con-
tinuance of the deprivation, had to be afforded. 52
The seizure was held no longer necessary to secure an impor-
tant governmental or public interest as the city had already exer-
cised its police power to regulate the use of its streets.55 The ex-
istence of alternative means to secure payment of the towing and
storage fees indicated that the practice of retaining the vehicle was
not a necessity.5 The court found there was no longer a need for
prompt action, since the vehicle had been removed from the streets,
and public safety was no longer in jeopardy.55 Finally, on the assess-
44. Id. at 545.
45. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
46. Id. at 339, 342.
47. 418 F. Supp. 542, 545 (E.D. La. 1976). In support of this proposition the court in
Rw"177 cited Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) ; and Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
48. 418 F. Supp. 542, 545 (E.D. La. 1976). It should be noted, however, that this re-
quirement may not be satisfied in the removal of all illegally parked vehicles. Graff v.
Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 29-34
s.ipra, held that due process requires that notice and an opportunity for a hearing be ac-
corded to owners of abandoned vehicles not obstructing traffic, prior to towing and ir-
impounding them. Id. at 983.
49. 418 F. Supp. 542, 545 (E.D. La. 1976).
50. Id. at 546.
51. Id.
52. Id.
5.. Id. at 545-46.
54. The court provided the alternative of posting a bond to insure appearance, as was
done when other violations were contested. Id. at 546.
55. Id.
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ment stage of the ordinance, the court stated that there was no
longer careful supervision by a public official, because fees were
collected from every vehicle owner without discretion, once the ve-
hicle entered the auto pound."6
North Dakota law provides for removal of vehicles which consti-
tute an obstruction to traffic, but apparently does not specifically
provide for the assessment of any towing fees or storage charges.
5 7
The ordinance declared unconstitutional in Remm is similar to
the ordinances of several North Dakota cities, for example, Bis-
marck,55  Dickinson, .5  Fargo,60  Grand Forks, "1  Jamestown, 2  Mi-
not, 3  Valley City, 64 Williston 6 5 and the North Dakota League of
Cities Codified City Ordinances.6 6 The only ordinances that provide
for notice that a car has been impounded are those of Bismarck,
'6 7
Jamestown, 8 and Minot. 9 None of these ordinances provide for an
opportunity to be heard, and all of them require the impounded ve-
hicle to be held until all expenses of towing and storage are paid.
7 0
In addition, the ordinances of Bismarck, 71 Fargo, 72 Grand Forks,73 Mi-
not,7 4 and Williston7 5 require that any fines or penalties imposed for
violation of the offenses which prompted the impoundment also be paid
before the vehicle is returned. The Bismarck, 76 Dickinson,7 7  and
Minot 5 ordinances also make it unlawful for any person to remove
56. Id.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-48(2) (Supp. 1975), provides:
Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon any highway,
bridge, or causeway, or in any tunnel where such vehicle constitutes an ob-
struction to traffic, such officer is hereby auhtorized to provide for the re-
moval of such vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety.
N.D. LEAGUE OF CITIES, MODEL MUN. ORDINANCES § 14-2 (July 1975), is identical to this
statute.
58. BISMARCK, N.D., CITY CODE §§ 35-26 to 27 (1973).
59. DICKINSON, N.D., CITY CODE §§ 20-68 to 69 (Supp. 1963).
60. FARGO, N.D., REV. ORDINANCES §§ 8-0126, 11-0401 to 0402 (1965).
61. GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY CODE § 8-1031 (1974).
62. JAMESTOWN, N.D., CITY CODE §§ 21-09-19 to 20 (1960).
63. MINO', N.D., CITY CODE §§ 5-1515, 17-0801 to 802 (1963).
64. VALLEY CITY, N.D., REV. ORDINANCES § 14-77 (1963).
65. WILLISTON, N.D., CITY CODE §§ 14.52 to .53 (Supp. 1966).
66. N.D. LEAGUE OF CITIES, CODIFIED CITY ORDINANCES OF ND. §§ 12.0504 to .0505
(19-).
67. BISMARCK, N.D., CITY CODE § 35-26 (1973).
68. JAMESTOWN, N.D., CITY CODE § 21-09-19 (1960).
69. MINOT, N.D., CITY CODE § 5-1515 (1963).
70. Of those ordinances providing for specific charges for towing and storage, Dickinson
assesses $5.00 for the towing and $.50 a day for storage charges, DICKINSON, N.D., CITY
CODE § 20-68 (Supp. 1963) ; Grand Forks assesses storage charges of $5.00 a day for the
first seven days, and $3.00 a day thereafter, and does not provide an amount for towing
charges, GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY CODE § 8-1031 (1974) ; and Minot assesses $5.00 plus
towing charges and $1.50 per day after the first day as storage charges. MINOT, N.D.,
CITY CODE § 5-1515 (1963). None of the other ordinances provide for specific charges for
towing and storage.
71. BISMARCK, N.D., CITY CODE § 35-26 (1973).
72. FARGO, N.D., REV. ORDINANCES §§ 8-0126, 11-0402 (1965).
73. GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY CODE § 8-1031 (1974).
74. MINOT, N.D., CITY CODE § 5-1515 (1963).
75. WILLISTON, N.D., CITY CODE § 14.53 (Supp. 1966).
76. BISMARCK, N.D., CITY CODE § 35-27 (1973).
77. DICKINSON, N.D., CITY CODE § 20-68 (Supp. 1976).
78. MINOr, N.D., CITY CODE § 5-1515 (1963).
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or attempt to remove an impounded vehicle without first paying the
costs of impoundment.
If a case similar to Remm arises in North Dakota, it appears
that the ordinances mentioned above 79 may be declared at least par-
tially invalid under the requirements of Fuentes v. Shevin.8 0 Although
Remm has questionable value as precedent in North Dakota, its ap-
plication of the Fuentes decision to the issue of prior notice and op-
portunity for a hearing before assessment of towing and storage fees
before return of an impounded vehicle is sound, and it is likely that
other courts will arrive at the same conclusion in scrutinizing simi-
lar ordinances. Although the impact of requiring due process in this
area is not a matter of life and death, it is significant to a vehicle
owner who may believe his! vehicle was impounded improperly.
TIMOTHY D. LERvICK
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-NEGLIGENCE-PSYCHOTHERAPIST HAS A
DUTY To WARN AN ENDANGERED VICTIM WHOSE PERIL WAS DISCLOSED
To PSYCHOTHERAPIST BY PATIENT
Plaintiffs, parents of a young woman murdered by a former men-
tal patient brought a wrongful death action against the regents of the
University of California, four university psychotherapists,' and five
policemen employed by the university. Prior to the woman's murder,
the patient, while in psychotherapy, had confided his intention to kill
a person readily identifiable as plaintiffs' daughter, but neither plain-
tiffs nor their daughter were warned of the patient's threats. Shortly
after learning of the patient's intention the psychotherapist, assisted
by the police, unsuccessfully tried to commit the patient. 2 Subse-
79. See ordinances cited in notes 58-66 supra.
80. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fieates has al'eady had an impact on North Dakota law. In
Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that North
Dakota's prejudgment attachment procedure, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08-01 (1976), was un-
constitutional because its provision for summary seizure did not meet the procedural safe-
guards standards established by Fitentes and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416'U.S. 600
(1974).
1. The psychotherapist defendants included Dr. Lawrence, the psychologist who exam-
ined the patient and determined that he should be committed; and Dr. Harvey Powelson,
chief of the department of psychiatry at the university, who rescinded Moore's decision
and directed that the staff at the hospital take no action to commit the patient. Tarasoff
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 430n.2, 551 P.2d 334, 340n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14, 20n.2 (1976).
In this comment, the term psychotherapist will include psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
2. After Dr. Moore had determined that the patient should be committed, he wrote to
the campus police, requesting that they briefly detain the patient. The police talked to the
patient and upon his assurance that he would stay away from the young woman, they e-
leased him. Dr. Powelson then ordered the hospital staff to take no further action to com-
mit the patient. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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